



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 18, 1983

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Interdepartmental Group No. 10

MEETING OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
ON START POLICY

January 14, 1983

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

State
Robert Dean

NSC
COL Robert Linhard

ACDA
James Timbie

OSD
Ronald Lehman

CIA

START Negotiator
COL Samuel Watson

JCS
BGEN John Nicholson

The IG met to review the work of the START special working group on confidence-building measures (CBMs). The IG discussed first the status of work on CBMs proposed in START, and then issues concerning Senator Nunn's Amendment to the FY 83 Defense Authorization Act. This amendment requires DOD to study possible CBMs in a number of areas and report its findings to Congress by February 1.

START CBMs

The IG heard a status report on preparation of the US negotiating position on CBMs for the next round of START. The most important outstanding item is that of criteria which define the major military exercises for which the sides will supply advance notification. The IG reviewed the package of exercise criteria which is currently ad ref to agencies, and discussed a number of the criteria. The WG was directed to develop a decision document on the exercise CBM by COB Tuesday, January 18 and to prepare an interagency-agreed text of the

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CBMs agreement (covering exercises and launch notification), based on ACDA's draft, for the NSC meeting January 25.

Response to Nunn Amendment

The WG has examined a number of CBMs in the categories set forth by Senator Nunn's amendment. The IG agreed to recommend to the White House the facsimile transmission capability be added to the Direct Communications Link (DCL), that the WG undertake further study of the desirability of upgrading the survivability of the DCL, and that the concept of Embassy-Government high-data-rate communications links (to connect the State Department/USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their respective embassies in each others' capitals) warrants positive consideration. The IG decided not to recommend a multilateral crisis communications network or a US-PRC hotline. The IG directed the WG to prepare a decision paper for the White House on those candidate measures where interagency disagreement remains: whether to establish a US-USSR direct discussion link, whether to propose a meeting of US and Soviet Defense Ministers, and whether to study further the concept of ICBM launch sensors as a means of enhancing US attack warning capability.

Finally, the IG agreed that a proposed Nuclear Emergency Information Agreement should be reexamined by the agencies as a multilateral agreement aimed at nuclear terrorism. It would entail the sharing of information among signatory nations should persons not acting in a governmental capacity acquire nuclear weapons, carry out a nuclear explosion, or plan to carry out such an explosion.

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